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The United States may not have a lengthy national history by European 
standards, but its 1787 Constitution has seen longer continuous service 
than any other written frame of government in existence today. The 
world's second oldest continuing constitution, that of Norway, was 
established nearly three decades later in 1814. Such constitutional dura- 
bility is exceedingly rare. Of the 160 national constitutions in effect in 
1983, no fewer than 101 were new since 1970. El Salvador alone went 
through thirty-six constitutions between 1824 and 1983, an average of 
one every four years and five months. The stability of American political 
arrangements, the slow pace of change in government policy, and the 
frequent appeal to constitutional law in defense of a particular viewpoint 
all reflect, at least in part, the extraordinary longevity of the United 
States Constitution. 
In 1987, Americans enthusiastically celebrated the bicentennial of 
their Constitution, displaying a genuine national pride in its design and 
durability. The commemoration focused attention on the Philadelphia 
convention and the founding fathers who drafted the Constitution two 
centuries ago. This was appropriate since Americans regard their govern- 
ment as basically undisturbed since that time. 
It is significant, as well as ironic, that the United States, a nation which 
in many ways prizes and indeed symbolizes modernity, glories in an 
eighteenth century constitution. Thomas Jefferson, who did not attend 
the Philadelphia meeting but followed its work carefully from his 
diplomatic post in Paris, expected a new constitutional upheaval at least 
every fifty years. Instead the Constitution has endured, in part because 
Americans ceased to think of it as merely a set of operating rules for the 
conduct of public affairs. They began instead to regard it as an inspired 
work of political genius, the embodiment of timeless ideals. For the most 
part it gained this status after the Civil War, viewed by many as principally 
a heroic defense and bloody vindication of the Constitution. Before the 
Civil War, the Constitution had been a matter of frequent dispute, 
mainly in terms of conflicting claims of state and national power. After 
the war, however, the Constitution was no longer seen as merely a frame 
of government, and one of disputable wisdom at that, but as a repository 
of immutable democratic principles baptised in the blood of patriots, a 
hallowed document worthy of civic worship. Americans endlessly quoted 
British Prime Minister William Gladstone's praise of the Constitution as 
"The most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain 
and purpose of man."2 
Its very vagueness also contributed to the Constitution's longevity. 
Because the founding fathers made its provisions so broad and general, 
the Courts, the Congress, and the executive could interpret it in sucl-i a 
fashion as to legitimize innovations in governance. When the Civil War 
affirmed central national authority far greater than the federal balance 
struck by the founding fathers, justification for the new order was 
obtained by a rereading of the original Constitution. Later, when the 
economic and social conditions of the 1930s fueled demands for greater 
national powers, especially for the executive, the Supreme Court, 
nudged along by a 1936 electoral landslide and an insistent Franklin 
Roosevelt, chose to read the Constitution in a new light. The original 
list of presidential duties was claimed as sufficient basis for broader 
exercise of executive authority. Each branch of government could find 
constitutional validation as it adapted to meet new and unexpected 
circumstances. Judicial review, the interpretation of the terms of the 
Constitution by the courts, had not been mentioned in the original 
document. Nevertheless, it developed rapidly, if not without controv- 
ersy, because of the evident need for some determining authority to 
resolve disputes over what the Constitution meant, especially as evolving 
applications caused it to be interpreted in different ways. 
The Constitution's survival for two centuries is also the result of its 
capacity for amendment. Formal changes in the government's charter 
could be made and judgments of the Supreme Court overridden by a 
method which bore the endorsement of the revered founding fathers. 
At various pivotal moments in the nation's history, support for the 
Constitution might have evaporated had it not been able to bend before 
the demands of reform. This proved particularly important during the 
initial state ratification debates (which produced the Bill of Rights), the 
Civil War (which led to three amendments), and the Progressive era 
(which generated four). Amendment gave the Constitution the flexibility 
required to resolve tensions. Furthermore, the promise of permanence 
associated with the installation of reforms in the Constitution itself 
helped persuade crusaders for change that their victory was complete 
and secure. To understand the longevity of the American charter of 
government, it is therefore necessary to examine this often overlooked 
or misunderstood feature. 
The Constitution owes its very existence to the failure of its prede- 
cessor, the Articles of Confederation, to contain an adequate amending 
mechanism. After only a few years, the Articles were found wanting, 
, and demands for change arose. The Articles stipulated, however, that 
alterations required the approval of every state, and that proved nearly 
impossible to obtain. In drawing up the Articles in 1776-77, the second 
Continental Congress had wanted to safeguard liberty by making certain 
that a central national government could not acquire too much power. 
Therefore the Congress defined the powers of government narrowly and 
made their alteration exceedingly difficult. The Philadelphia convention 
of 1787, ostensibly called to revise the Articles, instead took the radical 
step of disregarding them altogether. The delegates decided that the 
prevailing requirement of unanimous state approval made revision too 
difficult. The necessity to compromise to meet any state's objection 
would be too limiting. The founding fathers therefore proposed different, 
less stringent terms for the acceptance of the new Constitution and for 
its further amendment. Indeed it is overriding the Articles more than 
any other facet of its law-making that entitles the Philadelphia convention 
of 1787 to be called "revolutionary." 
Making advanced formal arrangement for altering the fundamental 
charter of government was a new concept in the late eighteenth century. 
Governments of an earlier day rested their legitimacy on claims of divine 
inspiration, sanction, and guidance. To suggest a plan which openly 
anticipated that government would not function perfectly and that mere 
mortals might need to make organic changes in its structure and authority 
would have been outright heresy. None of England's seventeenth- 
century Cromwellian constitutions, for instance, provided for amend- 
ment. Among American colonial charters, only William Penn's inno- 
vative Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 contained even an 
oblique and negative reference to altering the terms of government. 
The idea that governmental charters were never perfect but must be 
capable of formal modification from time to time if they were to avoid 
simply being disregarded as conditions changed only began to gain 
currency on the eve of the American Revolution. The idea of rational 
and routine constitutional change embodied the first principles of the 
eighteenth century enlightenment. American states, obliged to adopt 
new constitutions to legitimize their own authority following their 
1776 separation from Britain, began to include provisions for their 
revision. By 1787 eight state charters contained amendment provisions, 
with three giving the power to the legislatures and five to state con- 
ventions. 
Delegates to the Philadelphia convention discussed the desirability of 
an amendment provision early in their  deliberation^.^ When Edmund 
Randolph first presented Virginia's plan for a federal union, it included 
an amendment procedure. Virginia delegate George Mason called atten- 
tion to the American Revolution's principle that governments were 
, 
founded by the people, and thus could legitimately be altered or abol- 
ished by them. He asserted that "Amendments therefore will be nec-' 
essary and it will be better to provide for them in an easy, regular and 
Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence." Alexander 
Hamilton agreed that "an easy mode should be established for supplying 
defects which will probably appear in the New System." 
The means rather than the principle of amendment concerned the 
delegates. They showed no enthusiasm for the English concept of an 
unwritten constitution which allowed Parliament to make changes in the 
framework of government in the same manner and by the same majorities 
used to approve ordinary legislation. Such an amending system appeared 
too sensitive to a temporary majority or whim to insure governmental 
stability. Constitutional change should require, the founders thought, 
broader participation and a greater degree of agreement, a higher level 
of consensus. 
A requirement that Congress call a constitutional convention at the 
request of two-thirds of the states appealed to the delegates. They were 
determined to avoid placing the power of amendment exclusively in 
the hands of the national legislature. Some thought that the national 
legislature should not be involved in the process at all. George Mason 
argued that it would be improper to require the assent of Congress to 
an amendment. If Congress found a way to abuse its power, it would 
naturally refuse to agree to corrective action at its own expense. "The 
opportunity for such an abuse may be the fault of the Constitution, 
calling for amendment," Mason reasoned. 
The difficult question of amending procedure was among the last 
issues to be resolved by the Philadelphia convention. On September 10, 
1787, delegates finally hammered out the details of Article V, the 
amending provision. They did so in a way which mirrored their general 
approach of federal power sharing between state and national govern- 
ments. After securing the right of two-thirds of the states to initiate the 
amending process by obligating Congress to call a national constitutional 
convention at their request, the framers granted Congress non-exclusive 
power to propose amendments as well. Nevertheless, final state approval 
of all amendments, however initiated, was regarded as essential. A 
proposal to require ratification by two-thirds of the states was narrowly 
rejected on a 6 to 5 vote, but when the requirement was raised to 
approval by three-fourths of the states, it passed unanimously. 
Had the lower two-thirds ratification standard been endorsed, con- 
stitutional change would have been easier, of course. James Madison's 
proposal for limiting the size of House districts to 40,000 people, 
approved by Congress as part of the Bill of Rights, would not have 
fallen one state short of ratification. Left intact, it would have required 
a House of Representatives of over 6000 members following the census 
of 1980. On the other hand, the Equal Rights Amendment would have 
been adopted in 1975 when the thirty-fourth state ratified it. But although 
the founding fathers rejected the unanimous consent standard of the 
Articles of Confederation, they believed that the framework of govern- 
ment should not be altered without extremely wide support. By setting 
the standard at three-fourths, they insisted upon an even greater degree 
of state approval to revise the Constitution than the nine-thirteenths 
which they accepted as sufficient to put it into effect. They insisted on 
protecting minority positions until a very broad consensus among the 
states had been achieved. This has been criticized as undemocratic, and 
obviously it was. But it clearly indicates the founders' concern with 
defending minorities against democratic enthusiasms. 
As a last step in defining the amendment process, the Philadelphia 
convention approved the proposal of James Madison and seconded by 
Alexander Hamilton, two of the most influential delegates, that states 
be allowed to ratify amendments either by legislative action or through 
conventions. Congress could choose between the two methods without 
restriction. This provision was apparently slipped into Article V at the 
last moment without much discussion. It tempered the founding fathers' 
preference for representative government by making possible a rati- 
fication method which, as it turned out, would prove to be much closer 
to direct democracy. So it would be improper to use Article V as evidence 
that the founders were thoroughly hostile to democracy. Instead, they 
were seeking to balance what they saw as the ultimate authority of the 
citizenry with the benefits of seasoned leadership and governmental 
stability. 
The existence of the amending provision helped insure the acceptance 
of the new Constitution. As each state debated the proposed charter, 
critics raised objections to practically every one of its provisions. Sup- 
porters of the Constitution used Article V to offer reassurance. James 
Madison acknowledged in the 37th Federalist that the Constitution was 
not "a faultless work." Gouverneur Morris spoke for his fellow framers 
when he declared, "Surrounded by difficulties, we did the best we could; 
leaving it with those who should come after us to take counsel from 
experience, and exercise prudently the power of amendment, which we 
have provided." In the North Carolina ratifying convention, James 
Iredell soothed fears by saying, "There is a remedy in the system itself 
for its own fallibility, so that alterations can without difficulty be made, 
agreeable to the general sense of the people." In fact, the promise 
of prompt amendment to remedy the most serious objection to the 
Constitution, its lack of a bill of rights, proved crucial to the federalist 
victory in several state conventions. 
'The demand for immediate addition of a bill of rights forced the first 
Congress to face one question not addressed by Article V: Where in the 
Constitution should amendments be located? When James Madison 
introduced several amendments, he proposed that they be woven into 
the charter at appropriate places. Roger Sherman of Connecticut and 
other protested any alteration of the original text and argued for adding 
amendments at the end of the document. Sherman's proposal prevailed, 
setting a precedent which ever since has fostered the image of the original 
Constitution as sacrosanct. With amendments treated as supplements, 
no obligation existed to remove or clarify possibly contradictory con- 
stitutional language. On the contrary, the need would arise for the 
Supreme Court to determine which of the Constitution's provisions 
applied in a given situation. 
By the start of the twentieth century, the effort of the founders 
to make amendment easier than it had been under the Articles of 
Confederation appeared to have failed. Of the fifteen amendments 
adopted by 1900, twelve had been part of putting the federal government 
into operation. The Bill of Rights, the first ten, were adopted within two 
years of the ratification of the Constitution. Two minor amendments, 
the Eleventh and Twelfth, soon followed in 1795 and 1804. Since then 
only three more amendments had been adopted, all during the extra- 
ordinary first five years of Reconstruction after the Civil War. Many 
politicians and political observers thereafter concluded that amendment 
was impossible except under exceptional circumstances. 
Early in the twentieth century, however, amendments began to win 
approval. The stream was not large, but its flow was rather steady and 
certainly significant. Dealing with a variety of subjects and drawing on 
different bases of support, these amendments demonstrated that the 
founding father's intention could be realized: the Constitution could be 
revised, not easily but successfully, when a sense arose that other political 
means had failed and reform was imperative. Constitutional amendment 
was possible, in other words, when all else failed. As more amendments 
were adopted, the nature of the ameliding process and thus the Con- 
stitution itself became clearer. 
Between 1913 and 1920 four amendments implemented major Pro- 
gressive reform goals: a graduated federal income tax, direct popular 
election of U.S. Senators, women suffrage, and national prohibition of 
alcoholic beverages. Constitutional change was necessary to impose a 
direct national tax on personal incomes because in 1895 the Supreme 
Court had declared such a system of taxation unconstitutional. A growing 
need for federal revenue, the inadequacy of tariff and excise taxes 
(mainly taxes on liquor), and a spreading belief that taxes should fall 
most heavily on the wealthy (supposedly those who were deriving the 
greatest benefits from the society and government as well as those who 
would be least hurt by the tax) produced an irresistible demand for 
amendment. Specific provisions of the Constitution allowing state legis- 
latures to chose Senators and to define the franchise needed to be 
overturned if national policies of direct election and female voting rights 
were to prevail. Political demands for wider participation in government, 
especially to achieve popular reform objectives, overwhelmed con- 
servative preference for more restricted and controlled voting. Adoption 
of prohibition, an effort to gain a permanent national solution to the 
dilemma of alcoholic beverages, proved particularly significant in terms 
of the amending process. 
American prohibition, like the contemporary Norwegian movement, 
reflected the efforts of long-standing national temperance crusades to 
deal with a serious social concern. Its constitutional character is what 
gives the U.S. episode its distinctiveness. American temperance advo- 
cates believed that if a prohibition on alcoholic beverages was inserted 
into the Constitution, it could never be removed. The political require- 
ments would be insurmountable. Knowing this, opponents of prohibition 
would, out of respect for law, finally accept defeat. Drinking would 
cease, and the society would be the better for it. Or at least so the theory 
held.5 
The demand for constitutional prohibition rising from a broad con- 
stituency created difficulties for many politicians. Ohio Senator Warren 
G. Harding, for one, neither wished to see liquor abolished nor wanted 
to lose the votes of temperance advocates. Believing that only the two 
dozen states which had adopted statewide liquor restrictions were likely 
to vote for a national prohibition amendment in the foreseeable future, 
he cleverly proposed that he and others would vote for the amendment 
in Congress provided that it stipulated a seven year time limit on 
ratification. Harding figured that he and his colleagues could thereby 
appear to support the amendment, while at the same time dooming it 
to defeat. But to his surprise and horror, within thirteen months more 
than the required thirty-six states ratified the Eighteenth Amendment. 
The common political tendency to seek to satisfy as many interests as 
possible, together with a lack of understanding of the amending process, 
caused the downfall of Harding's plan. Seven year time limits have 
frequently been attached to amendment proposals since, but never again 
to such ironic effect. In the absence of such clear stipulations, the 
Supreme Court ruled in 1938, the validity of ratification procedures was 
a political question to be decided by Congress. 
National prohibition also raised other questions about the amending 
process. Anticipating congressional submission of prohibition and othe~ 
amendment proposals, the state of Ohio had adopted a law allowing 
public referendums on their ratification. When the Ohio legislature 
overwhelmingly ratified the prohibition amendment, citizens petitioned 
for such a referendum. In November 1919, Ohio voters rejected national 
prohibition by the slender margin of 479 votes out of a million cast. This 
was the only ratification referendum held in 1919, but others were in 
prospect as opponents of both prohibition and women suffrage sought 
to overturn legislative approval. 
The Supreme Court quickly rejected the Ohio referendum. The Court 
declared that Article V gave Congress sole power to chose the means of 
ratification, saying, "The determination of the method of ratification is 
the exercise of a national power specifically granted by the Constitution, 
and is limited to two methods, by action of the legislatures of three- 
fourths of the States, or conventions in a like number of States." 
Dismissing the argument that referendums were a part of thc legislative 
process, the Court ruled that the Ohio referendum had no validity. 
The Eighteenth Amendment was upheld, and no other amendment 
referendums were conducted. But a widespread public feeling arose that 
special-interest-dominated legislatures had approved prohibition against 
the will of a democratic majority. This sense of anti-democratic action 
planted seeds of opposition and resistance to the liquor ban. 
Throughout the 1920s the Supreme Court continued to interpret the 
Constitution so as to support the new amendment. Among other things, 
it approved expanded police powers of search and seizure. The Court 
allowed both state and federal governments to punish a single iiquor 
violation (a system which appeared to some to constitute double 
jeopardy). It also permitted police wiretapping of telephones. Under 
the leadership of conservative Chief Justice William Howard Taft, the 
Court clearly felt obligated to ensure the success of the Constitution's 
new provision, even when this led to new, perhaps dangerous govern- 
mental practices. Many of the law enforcement procedures approved 
during the prohibition episode would eventually be overturned in the 
1960s by a Court with very different set of constitutional priorities. 
The widespread and highly visible disregard for prohibition, together 
with the implications of its enforcement, alarmed and alienated many 
Americans, including some who had initially embraced a national ban 
on liquor. For several years, however, prohibition's critics despaired 
of remedying the situation. After all, no amendment had ever been 
repealed. To do so required a massive shift of support to reverse the 
margin of a two-thirds congressional vote and ratification by three- 
fourths of the states. Quite understandably, most people accepted one 
Senator's assessment: "There is as much chance of repealing the Eight- 
eenth Amendment as there is for a hummingbird to fly to the planet 
Mars with the Washington Monument tied to its taiLV6 Nevertheless, 
opposition to national prohibition continued to increase. Congress, 
viewing the sweeping 1932 Democratic election victory as a mandate to 
end the liquor ban, even though that assessment was unproven and 
unprovable, voted in February 1933 for a new amendment to abolish 
the Eighteenth. 
Leading antiprohibitionists, recalling the 1919 Ohio episode, insisted 
that Congress not send the repeal amendment to state legislatures for 
ratification. Repeal advocates successfully argued that the new amend- 
ment should be submitted to state conventions so that in selecting 
delegates the public could decide the liquor issue. While each state set 
the rules for its own convention, in most states voters had a simple choice 
between one statewide slate of wet convention delegates and one slate 
of drys. Nationwide, 73 percent of those voting preferred the wet slates. 
Of the thirty-eight states to vote in 1933, only South Carolina rejected 
repeal. The conventions quickly confirmed the public choice. No con- 
vention took more than a day, and New Hampshire's lasted a mere 
seventeen minutes. By December 5,1933, nine and one-half months after 
Congress approved the new Twenty-first Amendment, the ratification 
process was completed. No one argued that the outcome failed to reflect 
the popular will. 
Given the speed, relative ease, and unquestioned democracy of con- 
vention ratification, it is noteworthy that 1933 marked the only use 
of this method since the original Constitution was approved by state 
conventions in the 1780s. In recent decades, the procedure has not even 
been given serious consideration. When, for instance, the Equal Rights 
Amendment won congressional approval in 1972, its Senate sponsor 
assumed that the greatest hurdle had been cleared and that state approval 
would follow automatically. No thought was given to requiring con- 
vention ratification, thereby taking the matter out of the hands of state 
legislatures and giving the public a direct voice in deciding the issue of 
complete legal equality for women.7 The heavy majority of public support 
for the measure which opinion polls repeatedly indicated then existec 
was not called into play. One can only speculate what the results of 
convention delegates elections might have been. However, it seems 
noteworthy that the organized opposition to ERA, which helped stall 
legislative ratification three states short of the necessary thirty-eight 
approvals, did not fully emerge until 1975, long after a convention 
ratification process would likely have run its course. 
The prohibition episode made politicians cautious but not invariablj 
opposed to further constitutional amendments. After the Supreme Courl 
twice blocked congressional efforts to prohibit wage labor by children 
an amendment granting Congress such power was submitted to the states 
in 1924. The child labor amendment encountered stiff resistance, bul 
eventually won twenty-eight state ratifications and died only when il 
became clear in 1938 that the Court's thinking had changed enough tc 
permit Congress to accomplish its purpose by passing ordinary 
legislation. 
Amendments were adopted in 1933 to transfer authority to a new 
President and Congress more quickly after an election and in 1951 to 
limit a President to two terms (which Republicans championed after 
losing four elections to Franklin Roosevelt, but soon came to regret 
when Dwight Eisenhower was barred from a third term). Furthermore 
in the early 1950s Congress gave serious consideration to a proposed 
amendment to curtail presidential authority to enter into international 
agreements without Senate approval, thus reducing presidential inde- 
pendence in the conduct of foreign relations. After a heated debate, this 
so-called Bricker Amendment failed by one vote to achieve the necessary 
two-thirds approval from the Senate. 
By the 1960s, a half century after many thought amendment impos- 
sible, it had come to be viewed as a normal and manageable, if still 
infrequently used part of the law-making process. When civil rights 
developments and the death of John Kennedy suggested the need for 
changes in suffrage and presidential succession arrangements, amend- 
ment was regarded as a practical as well as appropriate solution. The 
prompt and seemingly easy adoption of amendments allowing the District 
of Columbia to participate in presidential elections (1961), outlawing 
poll taxes (1964), and establishing a new system of presidential succession 
and vice-presidential replacement (1967) seemed to dispel doubts about 
the workability of amendment procedures. 
A surge of confidence in the amending process as a means of changing 
both laws and social attitudes was evident, especially among political 
liberals, in two episodes in the early 1970s. Concern about the disdain 
of Vietnam era youth for the American political process led to calls for 
encouraging their participation by lowering the voting age from 21 to 
18. Among legislators, support grew rapidly for an 18-year-old suffrage 
amendment. A Supreme Court decision supporting 18-year-old voting 
in federal elections and the spectre of differing state and federal suffrage 
requirements led Congress to ignore the decisive rejection of lower 
voting ages in seven of eight referendums on such proposals in 1970. 
Early in 1971, an 18-year-old suffrage amendment sped through 
Congress. Its ratification by thirty-eight state legislatures followed in 
only 100 days. 
The following year Congress approved an amendment to ensure equal 
rights for womeii. This proposal had been around since 1923, but 
congressional support grew after the mid-1960s with the sudden surge 
of public interest in full equality for women. Within twenty-three months, 
the Equal Rights Amendment won ratification in thirty-three states, but 
the process then slowed. Two more states added their support by 1977, 
but they were the last to ratify. Even a controversial modification of its 
joint resolution proposing the amendment, by which Congress extended 
the original seven-year time limit on ratification by three years to 1982, 
could not generate the necessary thirty-eight state endorsements. Four 
state legislatures even reconsidered their initial action and voted to 
rescind their ratification of the amendment. It seems doubtful on the 
basis of their earlier interpretations of Article V, that either Congress 
or the Supreme Court would have held these rescissions to be valid, but 
neither body had to face this interesting and problematical question 
since the required three-fourths of the states never ratified the ERA. 
The ERA episode served as a dramatic reminder that state approval 
of constitutional amendments is not automatic, even with a two-thirds 
congressional endorsement and favorable public opinion polls. States 
retain enormous power in the amending process, perhaps their greatest 
power in a federal system which has steadily tilted toward central national 
authority at state expense. A handful of states, even those most sparsely 
populated, can block ratification of an amendment. In the 1980 census, 
the combined population of the thirteen smallest states was 9,800,000, 
or 4.3 percent of America's 226,500,000 people. Thus, convention del- 
egates or legislative representatives elected by a bare majority in those 
states, slightly more than 2 percent of the nation's population, could 
conceivably prevent an amendment's adoption. In the case of the ERA, 
the fifteen non-ratifying states contained 28 percent of the U.S. popu- 
lation, a distinct minority but one of the size that the founding fathers 
intended should have a veto on amendments. In fact, the most thinly 
populated states have never acted in unison to employ their dispro- 
portionate power in the federal system to either adopt or block any 
constitutional change. 
While ERA advocates called the support which the amendment 
received a sure sign of a national preference for equal treatment of 
women, opponents claimed that the amendment's ultimate defeat 
reflected a continued commitment to traditional social and family values. 
Proponents and detractors alike thus regarded the amendment as a 
symbol well worth fighting over, both before and after the fact. Although 
ERA supporters might have a more logically sound interpretation of the 
voting, their adversaries found plenty of solace in the failure of the 
amendment to obtain the degree of national consensus required by the 
founders. 
In recent years, other interest groups have sought to place symbols 
of their beliefs in the Constitution. Often they were responding to 
congressional or Supreme Court action to which they objected. Their 
dissatisfaction produced calls for amendments requiring a balanced fed- 
eral budget, permitting school prayer, preventing legal abortions, and 
ending racial integration imposed through school busing. The very 
difficulty of amendment allows the discontented to keep preaching the 
need for their remedy without having to face the consequences of 
success. 
For example, Ronald Reagan has called repeatedly for a balanced 
~udget  amendment. This most prominent amendment proposal of the 
1980s rests on the assumption that a balanced budget requirement would 
force reductions in federal spending. However, such an amendment 
might just as likely compel tax increases to fund a budget which Congress 
was unwilling to reduce. Reagan's actual budget policies ran directly 
counter to the principle of a balanced budget amendment, leading to 
the conclusions that either he was hopelessly confused or, more likely, 
was playing the same double game that Warren Harding once tried with 
such unfortunate results. The fact that a President can divert attention 
from actual policies with calls for constitutional amendment suggests 
both how confusing amendment proposals can be and how seriously they 
are taken. 
Questions about the wisdom of an actual balanced budget amendment, 
as opposed to symbolic gestures of support for the idea in order to 
discourage government spending, make it doubtful, though hardly 
impossible, that thirty-eight states would ratify such a measure. Indeed 
the odds against any amendment proposal succeeding are rather long. 
Since 1789 more than 10,000 proposals for amendment have been intro- 
duced in Congress, but only thirty-three have obtained two-thirds 
approval. Of these, twenty-six have been ratified (one repealing 
another), while seven have failed. However, if a balanced budget amend- 
ment overcame such odds, like-minded efforts to amend the Constitution 
would surely follow quickly, as was the case during Reconstruction, the 
Progressive era, and the 1960s. Amendments have been such powerful 
symbols of American political consensus that they have often encouraged 
further reshaping of constitutional arrangements. 
The amending system has thus far permitted enough constitutional 
alteration to mollify extreme discontent. At the same time, it has proven 
sufficiently resistant to change that it has produced a great degree of 
stability in American governmental arrangements. Thus it has functioned 
as the founding fathers intended, as a mechanism for change but at 
the same time as a brake on democracy, slowing and often stopping 
momentary majority preferences. Whether this conservative tendency is 
an admirable or unfortunate characteristic of the American Constitution 
remains a topic of debate. 
On occasion constitutional amendments have brought about extremely 
important national policy changes. Amendments abolishing slavery, 
imposing taxes in proportion to wealth, and prohibiting commerce in 
alcoholic beverages immediately and profoundly altered property rights 
highly valued in the United States. Each represented government con- 
fiscation of private property. Likewise, suffrage changes allowing black, 
female, and 18-year-old voting significantly shifted political power. 
Amendments have, in other words, fundamentally altered the policies 
as well as the procedures of American government. Furthermore the 
Supreme Court, regarding an amendment as a directive it must respect, 
has reconsidered previous constitutional provisions in light of a new 
amendment. 
As the founding fathers intended, amendment has allowed the modi- 
fication of the Constitution so as to prolong its acceptance and effec- 
tiveness and avoid its wholesale abandonment. The fact that the United 
States has been able to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Con- 
stitution does not mean that amendment and judicial review provide a 
perfect system for sustaining the charter's vitality. Nor does mere lon- 
gevity signify that the task of modification has been performed infallibly, 
indeed even always wisely. But the bicentennial should serve as a 
reminder that one strength of the United States Constitution and a 
reason for its extraordinary endurance has been its provision for its own 
ongoing reform and reformulation. 
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